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alogies of real estate have been departed
from, and the price paid or the consid-
eration money, is not considered conclu-
sive, but the actual value is inquired
into: Sedgwick on the Measure of
Damages, vol. 1, p. 556.
Upon the whole it appears that even
though under special circumstances a
court of equity might come to the relief
of a vendee so as to enable him to re-
cover his purchase-money, in the event
of the destruction of the premises by fire
pending the completion of the contract,
as for instance, where there has been
criminality or gross carelessness on the
part of the vendor, or where he has re-
ceived the insurance money but failed
to apply it towards the restoration of the
premises, the vendee cannot insist upon
such application of the insurance money,
whic , in point of fact, would be to in-
crease the value of his bargain by sub-
stituting newly built premises for old
and perhaps dilapidated ones, unless
such has formed a part of the original
contract. Where the contract is exe-
cuted and not merely executory, as in
the case before us, there is no room for
any relief even by a court of equity.
HUGH WEIGHTMAN-.
RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
Supreme Court of the United States.
THE MAHONEY MINING COMPANY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. THE
ANGLO-CALIFORNIAN BANK (LinTEr).
Where a mining company, by its charter, had power to raise money for use in its
corporate business, and in the ordinary course of its business drew money from its
bank account upon checks of the president and secretary which were an overdraft
on its account, the presumption will be indulged that these officers had power to
make an overdraft, and that in making it, not only that they did not exceed
their authority, but that the moneys thus obtained were paid over to or received
by the company.
IN Error to the Circuit Court of the United States, for the
District of California.
The plaintiff in error, a mining corporation, was organized
under the laws of California in 1873. From that time until the
21st of June 1877, its treasurer was the defendant in error, a
banking corporation created under the laws of Great Britain and
doing business in the city of San Francisco. During that period
the moneys of the mining company were, from time to time,
deposited with its treasurer, and were paid out upon checks signed
by the president and secretary of the company. In addition, the
bank allowed the account of the company to be overdrawn upon
like checks. Such overdraft, including proper allowance for inter-
est, amounted, on the 21st of June 1877, to $6319.59.
On the day last named, at 11 o'clock A. m., in an action then
pending in the District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District
of California, in and for the city and county of San Francisco,
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wherein certain stockholders of the mining company were plaintiffs,
and Ignatz Steinhart, S. Ileydenfeldt, P. N, Lilienthal, Otto
Esche, F. N. Benjamin, and the mining company, were defendants
-which action had been brought to remove those persons from
office as directors of the mining company-a decision was
announced by the court that the election under which said persons
acted as directors was invalid and void, and that they should be
ousted and removed. When that decision was announced, the
findings of fact by the court, as well as its judgment in conformity
with the decision, were reduced to writing and dated of that day.
They were, however, not filed with the clerk of the state court
until June 22d 1877, upon which day the judgment was recorded
by the clerk.
In the afternoon of June 21st 1877, after the announcement by
the judge of the state court of his decision, the individuals above
named met as a board of directors of the mining company, when
its president informed them that the account of the company with
the bank, its treasurer, was overdrawn to the amount of $6319.59,
gold coin of the United States, and that the manager of the bank
requested either the money or the note of the company. A reso-
lution was thereupon adopted authorizing the president and secre-
tary to execute, and they then did execute, in behalf of the
company, a note for $7500, payable, principal and interest, in
coin, to cover as well the amount overdrawn as other anticipated
advances. But no such advances were afterwards made.
When the foregoing resolution was passed, the persons partici-
pating in its adoption had notice of the decision announced by the
state court in manner and form as stated.
The present action was to recover from the company the amount
of its overdraft. The complaint contained two paragraphs or
counts: one, for $6351.72 gold coin, on an account, as of June
26th 1877, for money lent by the bank to the company, and for
money paid, laid out and expended by the former to and f6r the
use of the latter; the other, for a like amount with interest, being
the balance alleged to be due upon the note referred to, after
deducting all just offsets, which note, it was averred, was given in
consideration of the amount due the bank upon an account stated
between the parties on the 21st of June 1877.
The court gave judgment against the company for the amount
of the overdraft, with interest at the rate specified in the note;
whereupon, the ompany took the present writ of error.
MAIONEY MIING CO. v. BANK.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARLAN, J.-We are all of opinion that the bank is entitled to
recover the amount of the overdraft as shown by the cheeks signed
by the president and secretary of the mining company.
Upon the board of directors of the mining company was
imposed, by the laws of California (Civil Code, sect. 305), the
duty of exerting its corporate powers, and of bonducting and
controlling its business and property. Among the powers which
the company had (Civil Code, sect. 354), was the power "to enter
into any obligations or contracts, essential to the transaction of its
ordinary affairs, or for the purposes for which it was created."
Necessarily, therefore, the board had authority not only to desig-
nate the banking institution in which the money of the company
should be deposited, but to prescribe the mode in which, and the
officers by whom, it should be withdrawn, from time to time, for
the use of the company. It is equally clear that the board had,
as incident to the general powers conferred by law upon the com-
pany, power to borrow money for the purposes of the corporation,
and to invest certain officers with authority to negotiate loans, to
execute notes, and to sign checks drawn against its bank account.
And it is settled law that the existence of such authority in sub-
ordinate officers may, in the absence of express statutory prohi-
bition, be shown otherwise than by the official record of the
proceedings of the board. It may be established by proof of the
course of business between the parties themselves; by the usages
and practice which the company may have permitted to grow up in
its business; and by the knowledge which the board, charged with
the duty of controlling and conducting the transactions and pro-
perty of the corporation, had, or must be presumed to have had,
of the acts and doings of its subordinates in and about the affairs
of the corporation. Since checks against the account of the
mining company must, in the ordinary course of its banking busi-
ness, have been signed by some officer or officers designated for
that purpose, the bank had the right, in view of the long period
during which the checks of that company were signed by its presi-
dent and secretary-without objection, so far as the record shows,
upon the part of the company's board-to assume that those
officers had been invested with authority to sign all checks drawn
against the company's bank account. So long, therefore, as the
mining company had money to its credit on the books of the bank,
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the latter, in the absence of notice that the president and secre-
tary of the former had no authority to sign checks, was justified
in honoring all checks signed by those officers. This much we do
not understand counsel to dispute. Their contention, upon this
branch of the case, relates mainly to the liability of the mining
company for the amount of any overdraf checks signed by its
president and secretary.
Touching that liability, we have to say that since the mining
company had power, under its charter, to raise money in that
mode, for use in its corporate business, and since an indebtedness
thus created would, in the usual course of business, be evidenced
by the checks of its president and secretary, the presumption
should be indulged, not only that those officers, in making an
overdraft, did not exceed their authority, but that the moneys
thus obtained were paid over to or received by the company. But
that is a mere presumption arising fr om the conduct of the parties,
as well as from the general mode in which corporations organized
for profit conduct their business. That presumption, if not, under
the special circumstances of this case, conclusive, might have been
overthrown by affirmative proof of want of authority, express or
implied, in the president and secretary of the mining company to
make overdraft checks, and by proof that the company did not
receive the money paid thereon by the bank. There is, however,
no such proof in this case. The finding is entirely silent as
to whether the company did not receive and use the money. And
the finding that "no resolution or special authority of the defend-
ant was shown authorizing its president and secretary, or either
of them, to overdraw its account in bank," fairly interpreted,
means nothing more than that no proof was made, either way, on
that point. It does not necessarily imply that a resolution to that
effect was not, in fact, passed. nor that such special authority was
not, in fact, given. The meagre evidence upon which, according
to the special finding, the case Was tried below, is, we think,
insufficient to overturn the presumption which should be indulged
in favor as well of the bank as of the integrity and fidelity of the
officers of the mining company.
This conclusion renders it unnecessary to consider any other
question in the case. The judgment is affirmed.
Authority in an officer or agent of a different from that prescribed by its
corporation to do certain things on its charter or by-laws, may be implied from
behalf, or perform them in a manner evidence of an habitual usage or course
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of dealing notorious to the company, on
the part of the officer or agent, in ac-
cordance with which he did the act in
question.
Thus, in the following instances, clas-
sified according to the nature of the
act:-
1. NoTEs, BiLLS, &c. The company
has been held liable upon notes issued
by its treasurer: In re 'reat lVestern
Telegraph Co., 5 Biss. 363, or by its
agent: Butts v. Cuthbertson, 6 Ga. 166;
upon a bill of exchange signed by the
president only, and not, as required by
the charter, countersigned by the secre-
tary: Witte v. Derby Hhhing Co., 2
Conn. 260; upon a bill of exchange
signed only by the cashier and not
countersigned by the comptroller: Saf-
fmd v. Wyc/To, 4 Hill. 442; upon a
certificate of deposit signed only by the
cashier, instead of by the president,
vice-president and cashier: Barnes v.
Ontario Bank, 19 N. Y. 152; upon an
unsealed obligation for borrowed money
where the company's charter authorized
it only to "borrow money and issue
their bonds therefor :" 1i'cCullough v.
Talledega Ins. Co., 46 Ala. 376 ; and
see Jones v. Trustees, 46 Id. 626; San
Francisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9
Cal. 47] ; upon the cashier's endorse-
ment of a bill of exchange, although the
charter declared the bank should be
liable upon no contract or obligation
whatever not signed by the president
and countersigned by the cashier : Mer-
chants' Bank v. Central Bank, I Ga.
418 ; upon a draft drawn by the presi-
dent in the absence of the cashier, al-
though a temporary cashier was acting:
Neiffier v. Bank, I Head. 162; and see
Palmer v. Yates, 3 Sandf. 137 ; upon
a check certified by a teller: Farmers'
Bank v. Butchers' Bank, 16 N. Y. 125;
Cooke v. State Bank, 52 N. Y. 96 ; s. C.
50 Barb. 592 : Clarke Natioaal Bank v.
Bank of Albion, 52 Id. 592 ; Girard
Bank v. Bank qfPenn Tsp., 39 Penn.
St. 92; Willetts v. Phenix Bank, 2
Duer 121 ; Meads v. Merchants' Bank,
25 N. Y. 143 ; M3ferchants' Bankv. State
Bank, 10 Wall. 604: contra, see 1ussey
v. Eagle Bank, 9 Mete. 306, deciding
that a bank is not liable upon the tel-
ler's certification of a check, although it
be s own that there was a usage for the
teller to certify checks as "good ;" and
U. S. v. Fleckner, 8 Mart. (La.) 141,
309, holding that the endorsement by its
cashier, of a note belonging to a bank,
is insufficient to transfer the note unless
the act of the cashier was authorized ;
and that authority cannot be established
by showing that it is the common usage
of all the banks in the city to transfer
their notes and bills by the cashier's en-
dorsement.
2. INeSURANCE CONvTRACTS. A cor-
poration has been held liable upon a
policy of insurance countersigned by the
president's assistant instead of the secre-
tary : Bulkley v. Derby Fishing Co., 2
Conn. 252; upon a policy signed by an
agent instead of the president or vice-
president and secretary: City of Daren-
port v. Peoria Ins. Co.; 17 Iowa 276;
upon a verbal agreement to insure made
by the president only: Commercial, J5c.,
Ins. Co. v. Union, 4-c., Ins. Co., 19
How. 318; upon an agreement as to re-
moval of property signed by an agent
only and not by the president and see-
retary : N. ew, England Fire Ins. Co. v.
Schettler, 38 111. 166.
3. Moxyx. A corporation has been
obliged to pal money borrowed for it by
its secretary: Beers v. Phienix, 6-c., Co.,
14 Barb. 358 ; and by an agent: Allen
v. Citizens' Steam Nan. Co., 22 Cal.
28.
4. Goons. For goods supplied upon
the orders of a chairman, deputy chair-
man and secretary: Smith v. Hull Glass
Co., 11 C. B. 897.
5. SERVICs. It has been held liable
upon a contract for services made by
less than the number of directors legally
required : Bradstreet v. Bank of Royal-
ton, 42 Vt. 128; upon a contract to pay
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commissions made by directors who in-
dividually agreed to it in writing at dif-
ferent times, instead af acting simul-
taneously as a board: n re Bondlis Tel.
Co., L. R., 12 Eq. 246; see Edgerly v.
Emerson, 23 N. H. 555; and upon the
vice-president's contract for services:
Shisamel v. Erie 1ailvaI Co., 5 Daly
396.
6. TnixsFns or STocK. Usage has
been decided to render binding upon the
company a transfer of stock, although
the officers making the transfer dispensed
with seven days' notice thereof required
by the charter to precede the transfer:
.Re Royal British, 26 L. J. Ch. 545;
and see Chambersburg lns. Co. v. Smith,
11 Penn. St. 120; Bargatev. Shortridge,
5 R. L. Cas. 297 ; Union Mf. Co. v.
Rocky, 3. Arational Bank, 2 Col. 248;
and also Stamford Bank v. Ferris, 17
Conn. 259; Fairfield v. Adams, 16
rick. 381 ; Neo England, 6c., Ins. Co.
v. Chandler, 16 Mass. 275.
Usage may authorize the transfer of
stock certificates by endorsement in blank:
Kortright v. Commercial, 6-c.; Bank,
20 Wend. 91 ; 22 Id. 348, and it may
validate notices to stockholders which
are published in newspapers instead of
being personally served: Hall v. United
States Ins. Co., 5 Gill (Md.) 484 ; and
if it is the usage of a bank not to
permit stock to be transferred while
the holder is indebted to the bank, a
stockholder who becomes its debtor
knowing such usage is bound by it, and
neither he nor his assignees with notice
of the usage can maintain an action for
a refusal to permit a transfer of his stock
before the debt of the stockholder is
paid. The effect of the usage in this
case is to give the bank a lien upon the
stock for its holder's debt. "The bank
had an undoubted right to say to any
stockholder: 'We discount your note,
but remember until it is paid we shall
hold your stock in security ; you shall not
be permitted to transfer it until you pay
us.' There is nothing unfair in this.
VOL. XXX.-14
The terms are known and accepted, as
between the parties to the present agree-
ment, the stockholder and the bank.
This amounts to an hypothecation, a
pledge of stock. How it would have
been in controversy between a bona
fide purchaser tor valuable consideration
and without notice, who pays his money
to the stockholder on the faith of the
certificate, intrusted with the symbol of
the property, the constructive legal pos-
session, the title deed, on its face an
instrument transferable and assignable,
I do not give any opinion. It is a very
different question. But as between these
parties, call this answer of the bank
what you please, lien, set-off, legal or
equitable pledge, retainer, stoppage,
course of dealing: general understand-
ing, usage, contract express or implied,
it is a bar in law and equity to this
action." Per DUNCAN, J., in Mlorgan v.
Bank of North America, 8 S. & R. (Pa.)
73.
7. PAY31ENT To BAmc CLERK NOT
AUTHORIZED TO IECEIVE. In Mlan-
hattan Co. v. Lydig, 4 John. 377, A., in-
stead of delivering his money to the re-
ceiving-teller of the bank, handed it
from time to time to a bookkeeper of
the bank, who was also employed to
keep A.'s books, to carry and deposit it
in the bank for A. The book-keeper
kept part of the money and A. sought
to hold the bank for it. The court de-
cided the book-keeper to have been A.'s
agent in receiving the money, and that
A. must stand the loss.
In Thatcher v. Bank, 5 Sandf. 121,
the plaintiff had no account with the
bank, but having an obligation about to
become payable at the bank, left money
to meet it with the paying-teller, who
failed to pay the obligation upon matur-
ity, and plaintiff sought to recover
damages from the bank therefor. It was
shown that the paying-teller bad no au-
thority to receive money for the bank,
and that when he did receive money from
persons having no account with the bank
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with which to pay their maturing obli-
gations, he did it only occasionally, and
as a favor; that he sometimes refused,
and that when pressed into taking it frim
them, he kept it separate fi oin the funds
of the bank. The cashier knew that the
teller did this occasionally, and did not
forbid it, but the court declined to infer
from this an assent by the bank that the
teller should receive money for it; he
was decided to be agent of the person
who left the money, and the bank was
held not liable.
Terrell v. Branch Bank, 12 Ala. 502,
decides that a director was not the agent
of the bank in receiving a renewal note.
And see Sterling v. Marietta, 4-c., Co.,"
11 S. & R. 179.
In these cases there was no authority
given by the bank to the book-keeper,
paying-teller or director to act for the
bank in the manner in question. The
cases decide that no such authority was,
in fact, given, expressly cr by implica-
tion. But they do not hold that author-
ity could not be implied from usage, if
the usage were shown to exist.
Indeed, DOEn, J., in Thatcher v.
Bank, supra, said, with reference to a
usage authorizing the paying-teller to re-
ceive money on behalf of the bank.
* * * "We are not to bs understood
as saying that a bank in a case like the
present may not be rendeced liable by
proper evidence of such a general usage,"
&c. And see East, 6-c., Bank v. Gove,
57 N. Y. 597.
There does nor appear to be any dan-
ger to the corporation in allowing its
agents authority to be implied from a
continued course of dealing known to
the company. "If any officer vested
with certain powers should in any in-
stance violate them, and attempt illegally
to subject the corporation to any obliga-
tion, such corporation may instantly on
the discovery disavow the act and pre-
vent a repetition; and then as there
will be neither law nor usage to sanction
the transaction, it will not be binding."
Per SWIFT, C. J., in Bulkley v. Derby
Fishing Co., 2 Conn. 252. In this case
the opinion was expressed that, unlike
the case of a presumption of title,
arising from long-continued possession
and enjoyment, the usage need not be
ancient.
NoricE.-But where usage is relied
upon to show implied authority in
a corporate agent, it . must also be
shown that the company knew of
the usage: Johnson v. Concord Rail-
road Co., 46 N. H. 213; Dietrich v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 71 Penn. St
432. Such knowledge on ,the part of
the company may of course be express
or it may be implied from the notoriety
of the usage. Thus it has been decided
that the open and notorious custom of
all the ticket agents and conductors em-
ployed by a railroad company to pay out
illegal notes in making change to pas-
sengers is evidence as to whether the
custom was authorized by the company.
Judge BLAcn. said: " * * * Where a
conductor pays out an illegal note in
change to a passenger, the penalty caI-
not be recovered from the company
without proof that he had the authority
of the president, directors and treasurer,
or some of them. But is it necessary
that this proof should come in any par-
ticular form ? Will nothing do but a
solemn resolution of the directors in full
meeting assembled ? May it not be in-
ferred from circumstances? Surely it
may. In the present case the offer was
to prove not only that a large number
of small notes was passed upon two
persons in the course of a short time,
but that it was the open and notorious
custom of [as we understand it] all the
tickei agents and conductors employed
by the defendants to issue notes of a
similar character. Now what is the
natural presumption from this? May
a jury infer that the superior officers of
the company knew of the custom and
approved it? or must the court, as a
matter of law, determine without sub-
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mitting it to a jury, that all the conduc-
tors and agents were habitually violating
the orders of their masters, as well as
an act of the legislature ? It is for the
jury to say what is the natural presump-
tion which arises out of such facts, and
there is no rule of policy which requires
ius to make any legal or fictitious pre-
sumption on the subject. I wlll not say
what verdict ought to be given on such
evidence, but I am very clear, that no
man who is not a juror in the ease has
the right to decide that the president
and directors were ignorant and there-
fore innocent of a custom which was
open, public and notorious :" Common-
wealth v. Ohio, 4-c., Railroad Co., 1
Grant Cas. 350.
Aside from the implication from
usage of authority in the officer or agent
to make the contract in question, a
strong reason for holding the company
liable in these cases is that it had re-
ceived the consideration and benefit of
the contract, and hence should not be
permitted to repudiate it, and thus take
advantage of its own wrong. In Bur-
gate v. Shortridge, supra, Lord ST.
LEoNAnns said: "It does not appear
to me that if by a course of action the
directors of a corpany neglect pre-
cautions which-they ought to attend to,
and thereby lead third persons to deal
together as upon real transactions, and
to embark money or credit in a concern
of this sort, these directors cannot, after
five or six years have elapsed, turn
round, and themselves raise the objec-
tion that they have not taken these
precautions, and that the shareholders
ought to have inquired and ascertained
the matter. * * * The way, therefore,
in which I propose to put it to your
lordships in point of law is this: The
question is not whether that irregularity
can be considered as unimportant. or as
being different in equity from what it
is in law, but the question simply is,
whether, by that continued course of
dealing, the directors have not bound
themselves to such an extent that they
cannot be heard in a court of justice to
set up, with a view to defeat the rights
of the parties with whom they have
been dealing, that particular clause en-
joining them to do an act which they
themselves have neglected to do."
Acceptance and enjoyment of the
benefits accruing from the act or con-
tract of its officers or agents, even
though such act or contract be clearly
ultra vires and outside of the charter
powers of the company, will estop the
company from repudiating such act or
contract, and disclaiming responsibility
for it: Zabriskie v. Cleveland, 6-c., Rail-
road Co., 23 How. 381 ; Bissell v. M.
S., 6-c., Railroad Co., 22 N. Y. 258;
Parish v. 'Wheeler, Id. 494 ; Cary v.
Cleveland, S-c., Railroad Co., 29 Barb.
35 ; De Groff v. American, 6-c., Co., 21
N. Y. 124; Argenti v. San Francisco,
16 Cal. 255; McClure v. ilanchester,
6-c., Railroad Co., 13 Gray 124; Chap-
man v. Al. R., 4-c., Co., 6 Ohio St. 137;
Hale v. U. Mutual, 6-c., Co., 32 N. H.
297 ; Railroad Co. v. Howard, 7 Wall.
413; White r. Franklin Bank, 22 Pick.
181; Tracy v. Talmage, 14 N. Y.
162; RFlster v. La Rue, 15 Barb. 323 ;
Southern L. Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 5 Fila.
110; Gould v. Town of Oneonta, 3 Hun
401; Hazlehurst v. Savannah, 4-c., Rail-
road Co., 43 Ga. 54; Chicago Building
Society v. Crowell, 65 Ill. 458; uradley
v. Ballard, 55 Id. 413; Bank v. Ham-
mwnd, I Rich. L. 281 ; Silver Lake Bank
v. North, 4 Johns. Ch. 370 ; Potter v.
Bank of Ithaca, 5 Hill. 490; Suydam v.
Morris Canal, 4-c., Co., Id. 491 note;
Sackett's Harbor Bank v. Lewis Co.
Bank, 11 Barb. 213; Humphrey v.
Patrons' Mercantile Association, 50 Iowa
607.
A fortiori, then, will acceptance and
enjoyment of the benefits accruing from
the acts or contracts of its officers or
agents estop the company from repudi-
ating them where such acts are not ultra
vires but within the powers of the com-
MAHONBY MNING CO. v. BANK.
pany, and only lack some formality or
an express authority in the agent to
validate them.
And again, convenience and the
necessities of business afford good rea-
sons for implying, from uage, author-
ity in an agent to act on behalf of the
company in many ways without express
authority from superior corporate offi-
cials. The necessity of express author-
ity would tend greatly to hinder and
delay business transacticns entirely
legitimate.
When the principal case was decided
at the, circuit (Anglo Cal. Bank v.
Mahoney Mining Co., 5 Sawy. 255),
Mfr. Justice FIELD sustained the lia-
bility of the mining company upon
another and, apparently, an equally
solid ground, namely: That the cor-
poration, through the directors, had
ratified the over-drafts. It will be re-
membered that a decision of the state
court declared these directors to have
been illegally elected, and therefore to
have no power, as directors, to act for
the company. This decision was rendered
June 21st 1877, at 11 o'clock A. 3t.,
and some of the directors were informed
of it. Later on the same day they met
and, as a board, they ratified the over-
drafts. On the next day, June 22d,
the decision of the state court was filed
and entered of record. Mr. Justice
FIELD held that the decree took effect
only from the date of its record, up to
which time the directors "c were officers
defacto holding under color of an elec-
tion, having charge of the affairs of the
company, and capable of binding it in
all matters legitimately devolving npon
directors of the company." Citing Baird
v. Bank of Washington, 1 I S. & R.
411 ; Delaware 6- Hudson Canal Co. v.
Pennsylvania Coal Co., 21 Penn. St. 131.
" The fact," continued Judge FIELD,
" that the directors, or some of them,
were informed of the decision announced
by the judge of the district court,
where the resolution was passed, does
not change the efficacy of the resolution
as a ratification of the action of the
president and secretary in making the
over-draft. They knew that the de-
cision was not necessarily final; that
it might possibly be changed upoi
petition of counsel, or upon tie judge's
own motion. They knew at least that a
decision announced was not a decree
entered, and they were not required to
govern their action as though the one
was equally operative as the other upon
their position and rights as directors :"
Anglo-Cal. Bank v. 21ahoney Mining
Co., supra. And see Union Mining Co.
v. Rockey, 4-c., Bank, 2 Cal. 248, a
case very similar to the principal case.
Altogether, the decision of the princi-
pal case seems to rest upon such solid
foundations and to be so clearly right
that one is tempted to wonder that the
liability of the mining- company was
ever resisted, and to ask why a court
three or four years behind in its busiuess
and overburdened with other more im-
portant causes, involving far * more
doubtful questions, should have been
asked to pass upon it.
ADLBEIIT HAmILTON.
]RACKLEY v. HEADLEY.
Supreme Court of Michigan.
HACKLEY ET AL. v. HEADLEY.
Evidence of a custom is inadmissible where that to which the custom relates has
been expressly provided for in the contract in terms different from the custom.
A contract for certain logs provided that they should be measured or scaled in
accordance with the standard rules or scale in general use on Muskegon lake and
river. Held, that the scale in general use at the time the scaling was required to- be
done, and not that in use at the time of making the contract, was the one intended.
Defendants, being indebted to plaintiff in a considerable amount, took advantage
of his financial embarrassment, and refused to pay him unless lie would receive in
fell a less sum than he claimed; and he, being in pressing need of the money,
received the sum offered and gave a receipt in full. Held, distinguishing V ne v.
Glenn, 41 Mich. 112, not to be duress of goods.
ERROR to the Circuit Court of Kent county.
Smith, .Nims, Hoyt & -Erwin, for plaintiffs in error.
John 0. Fitzgerald, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COOLEY. J.-Headley sued Hackley & McGordon to recover
compensation for cutting, hauling and delivering in the Muskegon
river a quantity of logs. The performance of the labor was not
disputed, but the parties were not agreed as to the construction of
the contract in some important particulars, and the amount to
which Headley was entitled depended largely upon the determina-
tion of these differences. The defendants also claimed to have
had a full and complete settlement with Headley, and produced
his receipt in evidence thereof. Headley admitted the receipt, but
insisted that it was given by him under duress, and the verdict
which he obtained in the circuit court was in accordance with this
claim.
1. The questions in dispute respecting the construction of the
contract concerned the scaling of the logs. The contract was in
writing, and bore date August 20th 1874. Ieadley agreed
thereby to cut on specified lands and deliver in the main Muskegon
river the next spring 8,000,000 feet of logs. The logs were to be
measured or scaled by a competent person to be selected by
Hackley & McGordon, "and in accordance with the standard
rules or scales in general use on Muskegon lake and river," and
the expense of scaling was to be equally borne by the parties.
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The dispute respecting the expense of scaling re.atea only to the
board of the scaler. Headley boarded him and claimed to recover
one-half what it was worth.. Defendants offered evidence that it
was customary on the Muskegon river for jobbers to board the
scalers at their own expense, but we are of opinion this was inad-
missible. If under the contract with the scaler he was to be
furnished his board, then the cost of the board was a part of the
expense of scaling, and by the express terms of the contract was
to be shared by the parties. If that was not the agreement with
him, Headley could only look to the scaler himself for his pay.
This is a small matter; but the question what scale was to be
the standard is one of considerable importance. The evidence
tended to show that at the time the contract was entered into
scaling upon the river and lake was in accordance with the
"Scribner rule," so called; but that the "Doyle rule" was in
general use when the logs were cut and delivered, and Hackley &
McGordon had the logs scaled by that. By the new rule the
quantity would be so much less than by the one in prior use that
the amount Headley would be entitled to receive would be less by
some $2000 ; and it was earnestly contended on behalf of Headley
that the scale intended, as the one in general use, was the one in
general use when the contract was entered into. We are of
opinion, however, that this is not the proper construction. The
contract was for the performance of labor in the future, and as the
scaling was to be done by third persons, and presumptively by
those who were trained to the business, it would be expected they
would perform their duties under such rules and according to such
standards as were generally accepted at the time their services
were called for. Indeed, such contracts might contemplate per-
formance at 'times when it would scarcely be expected that scalers
would be familiar with scales in use when they were made. It is
true the time that was to elapse between the making of this con-
tract and its performance would be but short, but if it had been
many years the question of construction would have been the
same; and if we could not suppose under such circumstances that
the parties contemplated the scalers should govern their measure-
ments by obsolete and perhaps now unknown rules, neither can we
here. It is fair to infer that the existing scale was well known to
the parties, and that if they intended to be governed by it at a
time when it might have ceased to be used, they would have said
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so in explicit terms. In the absence of an agreement to that
effect, we must suppose they intended their logs to b'e scaled as the
logs of others would be at the place "and time of scaling.
2. The question of duress on the part of Elackley & McGordon
in obtaining the discharge remains. The paper reads as. follows:
"Muskegon, Mich., August 3, 1875.
"Received from Hackley & McGordon their note for four
thousand dollars, payable in thirty days, at First National Bank,
Grand Rapids, which is in full for all claims of every kind and
nature which I have against Eackley & McGordon.
"JOHN HEADLEY.
"Witness: THOMAS HUME."
Headley's account of the circumstances under which this receipt
was given is in substance as follows: On August 3d 1875, he went
to Muskegon, the place of business of Ilackley & McGordon,
from his home in Kent county, for the purpose of collecting the
balance which he claimed was due him under the contract. The
amount he claimed was upwards of $6200, estimating the logs by
the Scribner scale. He had an interview with Rackley in the
morning, who insisted that the estimate should be according to the
Doyle scale, and who also claimed that he had made payments to
others amounting to some $1400 which Headley should allow.
Headley did not admit these payments, and denied his liability
for them if they had been made. Hackley told Headley to come
in again in the afternoon, and when he did so Hackley said to
him: "My figures show there is 4260 and odd dollars in round
numbers your due, and I will just give you $4000. I will give
you our note for $4000." To this Headley replied: "I cannot
take that; it is not right, and you know it. There is over $2000
besides that belongs to me, and you know it." Hackley replied:
"That is the best I 'will do with you." Headley said: "I cannot
take that, Mr. Hackley," and Hackley replied, "You do the next
best thing you are a mind to. You can sue me if you please."
Headley then said: "I cannot afford to sue you, because I have
got to have the money, and I cannot wait for it. If I fail to get
the money to-day, I shall probably be ruined financially, because
I have made no other arrangement to get the money only on this
particular matter." Finally, he took the note and gave the
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receipt, because at the time he could do nothing better, and in the
belief that hd would be financially ruined unless he had immedi-
ately the money that was offered him, or paper by means of which
the money might be obtained.
If this statement is correct, the defendants not only took a most
unjust advantage of ieadley, but they obtained a receipt which,
to the extent that it assumed to discharge anything not honestly
in dispute between the parties and known by them to be owing to
Headley beyond the sum received, was without consideration and
ineffectual. But was it a receipt obtained by duress ? That is
the question which the record presents. The circuit judge was of
opinion that if the jury believed the statement of Ieadley they
would be justified in finding that duress existed; basing his
opinion largely upon the opinion of this court in 17yqne v. Glenn,
41 Mich. 112.
Duress exists when one by the unlawful act of another is
induced to make a contract or perform some act under circum-
stances which deprive him of the exercise of free will. It is
commonly said to be of either the person or the goods of the
party. Duress of the person is either by imprisonment, or by
threats, or by an exhibition of force which apparently cannot be
resisted. It is not pretended that duress of the person existed in
this case; it is, if anything, duress of goods, or at least of that
nature, and properly enough classed with duress of goods. Duress
of goods may exist when one is compelled to submit to an illegal
exaction in order to obtain them from one who has them in posses-
sion but refuses to surrender them unless the exaction is sub-
mitted to.
The leading case involving duress of goods is Astley v. Rey-
nolds, 2 Strange 915. The plaintiff had pledged goods for 201:,
and when he offered to redeem them, the pawnbroker refused to
surrender them unless he was paid 101. for interest. The plain-
tiff submitted to the exaction, but was held entitled to recover
back all that had been unlawfully demanded and taken. "This,"
say the court, "is a payment by compulsion : the plaintiff might
have such an immediate want of his goods that an action of trover
would not do his business : where the rule volenti non fit injuria
is applied, it must be when the party had his freedom of exercising
his will, which this man had not: we must take it he paid the
money relying on his legal remedy to get it back again." The
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principle of this case was approved in Smith v. Bromley, 2 Doug.
695 n., and also in Ashmole v. Wainwright, 2 Q. B. 837. The
latter was a suit to recover back excessive charges paid to common
carriers who refused until payment was made to deliver the goods
for the carriage of which the charges were made. There has
never been any doubt but recovery could be had under such cir-
cumstances: Harmony v. Binpkoam, 12 N. Y. 99. The case is
like it of one having securities in his hands which he refuses to
surrender until illegal commissions are paid: Sehole1 v. .umford,
60 N. Y. 498. So if illegal tolls are demanded, for passing a raft
of lumber, and the owner pays them to liberate his raft, he may
recover back what he pays: Chase v. .Dwinal, 7 Me. 134. Other
cases in support of the same principle are Shaw v. Woodeock, 7
B. & 0. 73; NZelson v. Suddarth, 1 H. & Munf. 350; White v.
.eylman, 34 Penn. St. 142; Sasportas v. Jennings, 1 Bay 470;
Collins v. Westbury, 2 Id. 211; Crawford v. Cato, 22 Ga. 594.
So one may recover back money which he pays to release his
goods from an attachment which is sued out with knowledge on
the part of the plaintiff that he has no cause of action: Chandler
v. Sanger, 114 Mass. 364. See Spaids v. Barrett, 57 Ill. 289.
Nor is the principle confined to payments made to recover goods:
it applies equally as well when money is extorted as a condition to
the exercise by the party of any other legal right; for example,
when a corporation refuses to suffer a lawful transfer of stock till
the exaction is submitted to: Bates v. Ins. Co., 3 Johns. Cas. 238 ;
or a creditor withholds his certificate from a bankrupt: Smith v.
Bromley, Doug. 695. And the mere threat to employ colorable
legal authority to compel payment of an unfounded claim is such
duress as will support an action to recover back what is paid
under it: Beckwith v. Prisbie, 32 Vt. 559; Adams v. Beeves,
68 N. 0. 134; Briggs v. Lewistoh, 29 Me. 472; Grim v. School
District, 57 Penn. St. 433; First Nat. Bank v. Watkins, 21
Mich. 483.
But where the party threatens nothing which he has not a legal
right to perform, there is no duress: Skeate v. Beale, 11 Ad. &
E. 983; -Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick. 14. When therefore a
judgment-creditor threatens to levy his execution on the debtor's
goods, and under fear of the levy the debtor executes and delivers
a note for the amount, with sureties, the note cannot be avoided
for duress: Wilcox v. Howland, 23 Pick. 167. Many other
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cases might be cited, but it is wholly, unnecessary. We have
examined all to which our attention has been directed, and none
are more favorable to the plaintiff's case than those above referred
to. Some of them are much less so: notably Atlee v. Backouse,
8 M. & W. 683; Hall v. Shultz, 4 Johns. 240; S'illiman v.
United States, 101 U. S. 465.
In what did the alleged duress consist in the present case ?
Merely in this: that the debtors refused to pay on demand a debt
already due, though the plaintiff was in great need of the money
and might be financially ruined in case he failed to obtain it, It
is not pretended that Hackley & McGordon had done anything to
bring Headley to the condition which made this money so im-
portant to him at this very time, or that they were in any manner
responsible for his pecuniary embarrassment except as they failed
to pay this demand. The duress, then, is to be found exclusively
in their failure to meet promptly their pecuniary 9bligation. But
this, according to the plaintiff's claim, would have constituted no
duress whatever if he had not happened to be in pecuniary straits;
and the validity of negotiations, according to this claim, must be
determined, not by the defendant's conduct, but by the plaintiff's
necessities. The same contract which would be valid if made with
a man easy in his circumstances, becomes invalid when the con-
tracting party is pressed with the necessity of immediately meeting
his bank paper. But this would be a most dangerous, as well as
a most unequal doctrine; an-d if accepted, no one could well know
when he would be safe in dealing on the ordinary terms of nego-
tiation with a party who professed to be in great need.
The case of Ty7 ne v. Glenn, 41 Mlich. 112, differs essentially
from this. There was not a simple withholding of moneys in that
case. The decision was made upon facts found by referees who
reported that the settlement upon which the defendant relied was
made at Chicago, which was a long distance from plaintiff's home
and place of business; that the defendant forced the plaintiff into
the settlement against his will, by taking advantage of his pecu-
niary necessities, by informing plaintiff that he had taken steps to
stop the payment of money due to the plaintiff from other parties,
and that he had stopped the payment of a part of such moneys;
that defendant knew the necessities and financial embarrassments
in which the plaintiff was involved, and knew that if he failed to
get the money so due to him he would be ruined financially; that
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plaintiff consented to such settlement only in order to get the
money due to him, as aforesaid, and the payment oif which was
stopped by defendant, and which he must have to save him from
financial ruin. The report, therefore, showed the same financial
embarrassment and the same great need of money which it is
claimed existed in this case, and the same withholding of moneys
lawfully due, but it showed over and above all that, an unlawful
interference by defendant between the plaintiff and other debtors,
by means of which he had stopped the payment to plaintiff of
sums due to him from such other debtors. It was this keeping of
other moneys from the plaintiff's hands, and not the refusal by
defendant to pay his own debt, which was the ruling fact in that
case, and which was equivalent, in our opinion, to duress of
goods.
These views render a reversal of the judgment necessary, and
the case will be remanded for a new trial with costs to the plaintiff's
in error.
The rule laid down by the court in
this case, that "duress exists where one
by the unlawful act of another, is induced
to make a contract or perform some act
under circumstances which deprive him
of the exercise of free will," recognis-
ing, as it does, the fact that such duress
may exist as well with reference to the
goods or legal rights of a party, as. to
his person, is at once so reasonable and
just, that the only wonder is that it has
not always been laid down in terms,
equally clear and comprehensive.
The rule laid down in the leading case
of Astley v. Reynolds, 2 Strange 915 ;
s. c., 2 Barnard, K. B. 40, in the year
1731, notwithstanding it was said in
Hull v. Sciultz-, 4 Johns. 245, that this
case was overruled by Knibbs v. Hall, i
Esp. 84, is believed to be well settled
upon reason as well as authority. Be-
sides the cases cited by the court in tie
principal case, see Lqfayette, J-c., R. R.
Co. v. Pattison, 41 Ind. 323; Brad-
ford v. City of Chicago, 25 Ill. 411 ;
Pemberton v. Williams, 87 Id. 16 ; Pres-
ton v. Boston, 12 Pick. 7 ; Town of
Lionier v. Ackerman, 46 Ind. 552;
Briggs v. Boyd, 56 N. Y. 289; 1 Story
on Contr. (5th ed.) sec. 510, where the
cases are collected ; Ewell's Lead. Cases
785, 786, and the cases there cited.
The principle of Astley v. Reynolds is
well exemplified in Pemberton v. Williams,
supra. In that case it was held, that
where th assignee of a purchaser of
land, who has contracted to sell the land
to another who demands to see his deed
therefor, is compelled to pay the original
vendor more than is due him, in order
to get a deed to satisfy his vendee, and
the payment is made under protest, it
is a fair question of fact for the jury,
whether the'payment is not involuntary
and made under a sort of moral du-
ress ; and if so, the excess above the
real sum due may be recovered back in
assumpsit under the common counts.
'Where instead of the payment of
money, instrument in writing is
given, under the same circumstances in
other respects as are held to warant a
recovery of money, a distinction is made
by some cases, one class of cases holding
such circumstances not to constitute du-
ress, while other cases hold that under
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certain circumstances such compulsion
may constitute such dures-s as to avoid
the instrument. The case of S7.eate v.
Beale, 11 Ad. & Ell. 083; S. C.,
Ewell's Lead. Cas. 775, wall illustrates
this distinction. In this case, Lord
DENmAN, C. J., in delivering the judg-
ment of the court, said: "We con-
sider the law to be clear, and founded
on good reason, that an agreement is
not void because made under duress
of goods. There is no distinction in
this respect between a deed and an
agreement not under seal; and with
regard to the former, the law is laid
down in 2 Inst. 483, and Shepherd's
Touchstone, p. 61, and the distinction
pointed out between duress of, or menace
to. the person and duress of goods.
The former is a construing force, which
not only takes away the free agency,
but may leave no room for appeal to the
law for a remedy ; a man, therefore, is
not bound by the agreement which lie
enters into under such circumstances ;
but the fear that goods may be taken or
injured does not deprive any one of his
free agency who possesses that ordinary
degree of fairness which the law requires
ail to exert."
In Atlee v. Baclouse, 3 M. & W.
645, where the cases are quite fully col-
lected by counsel, Lord A3INGERt, C.
B., said: " All the cases that have been
cited, if they are examined properly,
and without the bias that naturally be-
longs to counsel who examine them in
support of their client's case, will be
found to be cases of this nature, when
property has been unlawfully seized, or
unlawfully detained, for the purpose of
enforcing the payment of money that
was not due. - In all these cases (and
there is a great series of them) the party
against whom the goods have been
wrongfully seized or detained is en-
titled, after payment of the money, to
bring an action for money had and re-
ceived, to try the right ; as in the case
of tolls, where a man seizes property for
toll and exacts more than is due, the
party is entitled to bring an action for
money had and received. * * * In all
these cases it will be found that the
seizure and detention were for the pur-
pose of exacting money." In the same
case (p. 642), PAusE, B., said : "You
will find that the old cases which say that
duress of goods will avoid the agree-
ment are not law ; there may be duress
of the person, but not of the goods. It
certainly seems to me that this was not a
voluntary payment, and that unless there
was a consideration for it, the plaintifl
are entitled to recover ; but you must
show that there was no consideration."
Again, on p. 650, he said: "There is
no doubt of the proposition laid down
by Mr. Erle, that if goods are wrong-
fully taken, and a sum of mone is paid,
simply for the purpose of obtaining pos-
session of these goods again, without any
agreement at all, especially if it be paid
under protest, that money can be re-
covered back; not on the ground of
duress, because I think that the law is
clear, although there is one case in
Viner's Abridgment to the contrary
(9 Via. Abr. 317 ; Duress, B. 3;. 1
Roll. Abr. 587 ; 20 Ass. 14), that, in
order to avoid a contract by reason of
duress, it must be duress of a man's
person, not of his goods ; and it is so
laid down in Shepherd's Touchstone (p.
61) ; but the ground is that it is not a
voluntary payment. If my goods have
been wrongfully detained, and I pay
money simply to obtain them again, that
being paid under a species of duress or
conqtraint, may be recovered back ; but
if, while my goods are in possession of
another person, I make a binding agree-
ment to pay'a certain sum of money,
and to receive them back, that cannot be
avoided on the ground of duress."
The distinction taken in Skeate v.
Beale, and Atlee v. Backhouse, may be
considered as settled in England, and
has received some support in the United
States. See Hlazelrdgg v. Donaldson, 2
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Met. (Ky.) 445 ; also Jones v. Bridge,
2 Sweeny 431 ; Burr v. Burton, 18 Ark.
233.
The clear tendency of American au-
thority, however, is against this distinc-
tion, and in favor of holding the giving
of a written instrument instead of pay-
ing the money, when the other requisite
circumstances concur, to be an immaterial
circumstance. The leading ease upon
this side of the question is Sasportas v.
Jennings, 1 Bay (So. Car.) 470; s. c.,
Ewell's Lead. Cas. 782, decided in
1795, which lays down the rule that du-
ress of goods will avoid a written instru-
ment if either of these essentials is
wanting: 1. Ability in the person or
persons imposing the duress to make
recompense. 2. A prompt and effectual
method to compel satisfaction. See also,
Collins v. Westbary, 2 Bay 211 ; Bing-
hain v. Sessions, 14 Miss. 22; Nelson v.
Suddarth, I Hen. & Munf. 350; Craw-
ford v. Cato, 22 Ga. 594; Miller v.
Miller, 68 Penn. St. 493; White v.
.Reylman, 34 Id. 142; Spaids v. Bar-
rdt, 57 Ill. 293; Bennett v. Ford, 47
Ind. 264 ; Modlin v. N. W. Turn-
pike Co., 48 Id. 492; Ewell's Lead.
Cases 787.
The general tendency of the American
courts seems clearly to be towards a lib-
eral extension of the common-law rules
as to what constitutes duress. In the
principal case, it is conceded by the court
that, assuming the correctness of Head-
ley's statement of the circumstances
claimed to constitute duress, "the de-
fendants not only took a most unjust
advantage of Headley, but they obtained
a receipt which, to the extent that it
assumed to discharge anything not hon-
estly in dispute between the parties, and
known by them to be owing to HIadley
beyond the sum received, was without
consideration, and ineffectual." Had
money passed from the plaintiff to the
defendants, instead of a receipt for the
amounC remitted from the sum justly
due, on the authority of Astley v. Rey-
aolds and Pemberton v. Williams, it would
seem that it would have been a question
of fact for the jury whether such a pay-
ment was not "involuntary, and made
under a sort of moral duress ;" and, if
so, the excess would have been recover-
able. Now, in this case, no money passed
from the plaintiff to the defendant, but
a receipt in full was given ; and it would
seem to have been a proper question to
submit to the jury, on the authority of
Sasportas v. Jeaninqs and other cases
disregarding the distinction between
written instruments and payments of
money, whether the receipt was not
given by the plaintiff "under cir-
cumstances which deprived him of the
exercise of free will ;" and, if it was,
that it ought to be regarded as having
been given under a species of duress.
From the report of the case, though the
form in which the question was sub-
mitted to the jurly is not stated, such
appears to have been their finding. If
embracing the opportunity afforded by
the pecuniary embarrassment of, the
plaintiff; and withholding the amount
due the plaintiff for the mere purpose
of compelling a settlement for less than
was actually due, was an unlawful act;
and if it did in fact deprive the plain-
tiff of the exercise of his free will, and
force him to accept in full satisfaction
less than was due him, as appears to
have been found by the jury, it is diffi-
cult to see why the case does not fall
within the definition quoted. If the jury
did not find generally that the receipt
was given under circumstances which
deprived plaintiff of the exercise of free
will, there would be great force in the
argument that the defendants, not hav-
ing caused or contributed to the plain-
tiff's embarrassment, the duress was to
be found exclusively in defendants' fail
ure to meet promptly their pecuniary
obligations ; but, so far as the report
of the case shows (though of course the
record may disclose facts not appearing
in the report which would modify this
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statement), this does not appear to have
been the finding of the jury, but matter
of argument on the part of the court.
Doubtless, the finding was that all the
circumstances narrated collectively con-
stituted duress. If the definition given
by the court is correct, duress is a rela-
tive term; and it cannot be said, as
matter of law, that any particular com-
pulsion' constitutes duress as to all per-
sons, or even as to the same person under
all circumstances. 'What constitutes du-
ress is believed to be a mixed question
of law and fact, depending upon the
circumstances of the particular case in
question, and no good reason is per-
ceived why the pecuniary embarrass-
ments of the plaintiff should not be
considered in determining whether he
was deprived of the free exercise of his
will, whether that embarrassment was
caused by the defendants or not, for the
reason that, if thus embarrassed, the
free exercise of his will would be more
easily overcome. Whether we arc right
or not in the view we have taken of this
question, the case is an important and
interesting one, and it is to be regretted
that the very able court by whom the
judgment was rendered could not have
seen its way consistent with the rules
of law to remedy what they appear to
concede to be an act of injustice. It is,
however, possible that, in the view we
have taken of this case, we may have
illustrated the saying that "hard cases
make bad law."
M. D. EwELL.
Chicago.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
JOSEPH UHL ET AL. V. JOHN HARVEY.
The general liability of a person as a partner, who is not so in fact, arises from
the fact that he has held himself out as such to the world, or permitted others to do
so, and that by reason thereof lie is estopped from denying that he is one as against
persons who have in good fidth dealt with the firm, or with the person so held out
as a member of it.
It is an absolute requirement that a retiring partner shall give proper notice of
his withdrawal, and failing to do so, from whatever cause, he must suffer the
consequences.
It is immaterial whether the failure to give proper notice of retirement is wilful
or negligent, or arose from causes enforced and beyond control.
The retiring partner escapes continued liability, not by ceasing to hold himself
out as a partner, but by givii g affirmative notice of the dissolution or of his
withdrawal.
One whose membership in a business partnership has been publicly advertised in
the community where the business is prosecuted, owes a duty on retiring to give
notice thereof, not merely to the customers who have had actual transactions, but to
the public who may be misled into giving future credit, on the supposed responsi-
bility of him who retires.
Appellant's name was signed with his copartners' names to a notice of the
formation of a partnership published in a daily newspaper; after the publication
had continued some time it was discontinued, but the business of the firm con-
tinued. Under such a state of facts, there is no legal presumption that the appel-
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lant ceased to be- a member of the firm because be failed to keep up a newspaper
notice of his connection with such firm.
A party cannot retire from a partnership, and permit the remaining partner to
use his name, so as to give the partnership credit, without incurring the liabilities
of such partnership entered into after his retirement.
It is a question for the juy whether the party acted in good faith in retiring from
such partnership.
It is a question for the jury whether the party seeking to hold a retired partner
upon obligations entered into afterward, had notice, or was put upon inquiry, of
such retirement.
It is not commendable in pleading to anticipate in the complaint matters of
defence and reply thereto.
THIs was an action on four certificates of deposit. The com-
plaint contained two paragraphs relating to each certificate, the
first charging that defendant Uhl (appellant) was a partner of the
banking firm by which the certificates were issued, and the second
charging that be had been a partner, and had continued to allow
himself to be held out to the world as such, down to the time of
plaintiff's deposit of the money and receipt of the certificates.
H. Winfield and Justice J- Owens, for appellant
George B. Ross, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WooDs, J.-It seems to us, the issues in the case and the trial
of it might well have been simplified and the ends of justice cor-
respondingly promoted, by the omission from the complaint of the
second, fourth, sixth and eighth paragraphs in which it is charged
that appellant. allowed himself to be held out as a partner. They
are drawn upon a mistaken theory. While it is true, under the
Code, that the complaint must state the facts constituting the
cause of action, this does not mean that a full history of the trans-
action out of which the action arises must be given. It is not
commendable pleading to anticipate in the complaint matters of
defence, and reply thereto, as is done in the above-named para-
graphs. If the appellee was entitled to judgment against the
appellant, it was because the appellant was bound by the contracts
sued on as if he made them. There is in the books and cases
some confusion in reference to the principle upon which rests the
responsibility of a retiring partner: Pars. on Part. 411; Gow on
Part. (3 Am. ed.) 240. In Cregler v. -Duram, 9 Ind. 375, it is
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said: " He was not liable as a contracting party because he was
not in fact a member of the firm when the contract was made;
hence he was not a party to it. If liable at all, then it must be on
the ground that the plaintiff had the right to treat him as a member
and give credit to him as such."
Here is a manifest inconsistency. The following is a better
statement:
"The general ground of liability of a person as a partnei who is
not so in fact, is that he has held himself out as such to the world,
or permitted others lo do so, and that by reason thereof he is
estopped from denying that he is one, as against persons who have
in good faith dealt with the firm or with the person so held out as
a member of it :" Reber v. .I. Co., 12 Ohio St. 175; .Drennen
v. House, 41 Penn. St. 30; Sherrod v. Langdon, 21 Iowa 518:
3 Kent. Com. 66.
And it will' not do to say as has sometimes been done, that the
estoppel springs from the retiring partner's negligent conduct in
forbearing to give notice: Gow on Part., supra. The liability con-
tinues because of the failure to give the proper notice of retirement,
and it is immaterial whether the failure was wilful or negligent, or
arose from causes unforeseen and beyond control. If negligence
were the test, then in all cases inquiry might have to be made into
alleged excuses for the failure. But the rights of a creditor cannot
be made to depend on the result of such an inquiry. The only
just rule is an absolute requirement that the retiring partner shall
give proper notice of his withdrawal, and, failing to do so, from
whatever cause, he must suffer the consequences. There is no
injustice in this. Better than any other, he knows or may be
presumed to know, the risks of continued liability, and if the emer-
gency requires it, he can take the necessary steps to give special
notice to any customer, old or new, until adequate general notice
can be published.
Returning to the point under consideration, it was enough that
the plaintiff should have charged the appellant as a maker of the
certificates, as was done in the first, third, fifth and seventh para-
graphs of the complaint, and the sworn denial of which presented
the whole question of liability, and made admissible all the evi-
dence adduced, whether to show the partnership, the facts con-
cerning the appellant's retirement, and the alleged failure to give
notice thereof, or the appellee's knowledge on the subject. But
UIL v. HARVEY. 121
on the strength of the answers of the jury to interrogatories,
showing that the appellant had withdrawn, and was not a member
of the firm when the certificates were issued, the court on the
appellant's motion gave judgment in his favor upon the last-named
paragraphs, and rendered judgment for the appellee upon the
other two paragraphs, whose sufficiency must, therefore, be deter-
mined as though they alone constituted the complaint.
The substance of the objections made to them is, First. That it
may be presumed, for aught that is averred, that from and after
January 1st 1874, the appellant, Uhl, ceased to hold himself out
as a partner in the business; and that after the lapse of so long a
time the appellee, who had not before had any transaction with
the firm, had no right to presume on a continuance of his member-
ship, the name of the firm being such as to afford no indication on
the subject; and second, that while the plaintiff avers want of
knowledge of the retirement of the appellant, he does not deny
knowledge that Stanley, Atkinson, Whiteside or Thompson had
retired, and that the firm had thereby been dissolved.
These objections are not sound. There is no legal presumption
that the appellant ceased to be a member of a firm whose business
continued uninterruptedly, because he ceased to keep up a news-
paper notice of his connection. Once the public were well
informed of the membership of the firm, there was probably no
profit in keeping up the notice, and the rule is that the retiring
partner escapes continued liability, not by ceasing to hold himself
out as a partner, but by giving affirmative notice of the dissolution,
or of his withdkrawal from the membership of the firm. As to the
second point, the parties named are made defendants in the case,
and the necessary inference from the'allegations made is that they
had continued in the partnership, and, in the absence of averment
to that effect, there is certainly no presumption that others not
named had come into the firm. The paragraphs show the appel-
lant's connection with the firm, and the public advertisement of
the fact, prior to January 1874, the want of publication of notice
of his retirement, and that the appellee, who knew of his member-
ship but not of his retirement, gave credit to the firm in the usual
course of its business, in the belief that the appellant was a
member, and this is enough to entitle the appellee to recover, not-
withstanding he had had no previous dealings with the firm during
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the time -when the appellant was a member. One whose member-
ship in a business pa.rtnership has been publicly advertised in the
community where the business is prosecuted, owes a duty on retir-
ing to give notice thereof, not merely to the customers who have
had actual transactions, but to the public who may be misled into
giving future credit on the supposed responsibility of him who
retires: Pars. on Part. *411; Collyer on Part., sect. 530
There was no available error in sustaining demurrers to any of
the answers, because, as already stated, they contained nothing
which was not provable under the sworn general denial. The
answers to which the demurrers were overruled, were nothing
but special or argumentative denials of matters averred in the
complaint, and might well have been stricken out, but being
allowed to stand, they closed the issue and neither called for nor
admitted of reply. There was, therefore, no error in sustaining a
demurrer to replies which on motion might properly have been
stricken from the files: State ex rel. Griswold v. Blair, 32 Ind..
313.
. Exceptions were saved to a number of the instructions given to
the jury.
The sixth instruction, after enunciating a rule in general
language to which no objection is made, proceeds as follows: "So
in this case if the defendant Uhl, by his words or conduct, induced
the plaintiff to believe him to be a member of the People's Bank,
and the plaintiff upon such representations made the deposits evi-
denced by the certificates sued on, he is liable as fully as if he
were in fact a member, for he negligently left the plaintiff to
believe him still a member and to deal with the firm upon that
belief, and I state it as the law in this case, that it is not necessary
that the defendant, Uhl, personally make such representations;
but if the plaintiff deposited his money with said Peoples' Bank,
and previous to that time it was a matter of public notoriety that
defendant, Uhl. was a member of said firm, and such notoriety
originated through him or his copartners, in that case it is his
duty to prove that he informed the public of his retirement, and
if he has failed to do that, then the public was justified in believ-
ing him to be a member."
In this connection it may be stated that the appellant bad saved
his exception to the refusal of the court to give the following
instruction :
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" No. 17. If you find that these advertisements were made
without the knowledge or consent of lUhl, and he, as soon as he
heard of them, caused them to be taken out of the papers, then I
charge you as the law that he is not bound by them; no person is
bound by the act of another, unless done by his authority, or with
his knowledge without objection."
The position of the appellant, in reference to the instruction
given, is sufficiently indicated by the terms of that which was
refused; and if. as claimed, the jury was in effect instructed or led
to -uppose that the appellant might be held responsible for acts
which be neither did nor authorized another to do, and had no
knowledge of being done, we could not hesitate to declare that
material error had been committed. But properly construed, with
reference to the evidence in the case, it is clear that by the notoriety
mentioned as having originated through him or his copartners,
reference was had to the acts of himself or copartners while they
bore that relation to each other; and the proof being clear and
undisputed that the appellant lived in Logansport'where the busi-
ness was conducted, and where he was publicly advertised as a
stockholder, and with the other stockholders as personally responsi-
ble upon the liabilities of the company, he was clearly responsible
for the notoriety so produced, whether he or his partners caused
the advertisement to be put into the daily papers where it was
published. The evidence went further, however, and showed that
the advertisement, a copy of which will be given further along,
was kept in the paper after appellant's withdrawal, and until
March 1876, or later, when, upon the order of appellant, it was
stopped, or his name omitted therefrom; and it is to this fact that
the instruction which the court refused to give was intended by the
appellant to be addressed. But the instruction was wrong, and
was properly refused. It was the unquestioned duty of the appel-
lant to give notice of his retirement immediately upon its occur-
rence, if 'not in anticipation of the fact, and this duty certainly
includes the corresponding obligation on his part to see to it that
the advertisement of the firm which showed his connection should
be discontinued. His ignorance, from inattention or from what-
ever cause, that the publication was continued, could not exonerate
him. His position called for affirmative action, the giving of
unequivocal notice, of his retirement, which implies the duty
of withdrawing Iall contradicting advertisements which were
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known, or from the circumstances might be presumed to have
been known, to him. As applied to the evidence, therefore, there
was no error committed in reference to these instructions.
The tenth instruction given was this:
"The law requires that, upon one member retiring from a part-
nership he must give notice of his retirement, and in giving notice
of his retirement he must act in good faith. Now, if you find that
Joseph Uhl, when he retired from the Peoples' Bank, before that
agreed that he would keep his retirement a secret, and he did
keep it a secret, then he did not act in good faith in his retire-
ment; but by his agreement to keep his retirement a secret, he
consented that he should continue to be represented as a member
while that agreement continued."
It is true, as counsel contend, that it is not an absolute require-
ment of the law that notice be given, but only in case the one
retiring were known as a partner, and in favor of an old dealer, or
a new dealer who knew that he had been a member; but these are
points sufficiently explained by other instructions which were
given, and, in view of the evidence, this i struction was entirely
proper. If, as there was some evidence tending to show, the
appellant, before retiring, agreed to keep the fact secret, and he
did afterwards keep it a secret, or withhold notice of the fact from
the public, it was a wrongful act which should make him liable to
any one thereby misled into dealings with the firm in the belief
that he was a member.
The eleventh instruction is as follows:
"If you find that Joseph Uhl retired in 1874, that he told some
parties, before the plaintiff commenced dealing with the firm, that
he had retired; and you also find that to others he represented
himself as being a member, that is a fact which you may consider
in determining whether or not he acted in good faith in giving
notice of his retirement. I also say to you, that it is a matter of
fact for you to determine whether or not Mr. Uhl acted in good
faith, and whether or not the notice he gave, if you find that he
gave any notice at all, is sufficient."
Counsel insist that it was not an issue in the case nor material
to be considered, whether the appellant acted in good faith, and
that, therefore, it was not proper to give this instruction. It was,
however, a question in the case, whether the appellant was a
partner when the certificate was issued. He had been a partner,
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and unless he had retired, was yet; but if he retired in bad faith,
endeavoring to leave the concern the credit of his name, and yet to
escape liability, then his bad faith defeated his purpose and left
him liable in fact as well as in appearance. It is true that the
appellee needed not under the issues to prove so strong a case in
order to prevail; but, nevertheless, he had a right to make the
attempt, and to have it submitted in that view to the jury.
Among the causes assigned for a new trial, is the alleged error
of the court in permitting the introduction of testimony that "it
was currently reported in Logansport that UhI was a member of
the firm of Peoples' Blank up to the fall of 1875." The only
point made against its introduction, however, is that it was not
admissible for the purpose of showing either the existence of the
partnership or the appellant's connection therewith.
In this position counsel are unquestionably right: Earl v.
.Hzrd, 5 Blackf. 248; Cregler v. Durham, 9 Ind. 885; Macy v.
Combs, 15 Id. 469 ; Brown v. Crandall, 11 Conn. 92; Halliday
v. McDougall, 20 Wend. 80. But aside from the instructions of
the court, which limited the application of this testimony to the
subject of notice of the partnership and of the appellant's retire-
ment therefrom, to which it was clearly relevant and competent,
the jury found in answer to an interrogatory that the appellant was
not a partner after April 1874, and so it is clear that the evidence
did not harm the appellant in that respect.
The advertisement already referred to, and which was shown to
have been published in the Daily Star while the appellant was a
partner, and after his retirement, was of the tenor following:
"People's Bank Stockholders: Josephus Atkinson, Joseph Uhl, William H.
Whiteside, George Strecker, William H. Standley, E. 1R. Thompson of Delaware,
Ohio. Doing general banking business. Organized under the laws of the state,
making every stockholder individually responsible for all liabilities."
And in reference to this the appellant requested the following
instruction, and others involving the same idea, which were refused:
"No. 15. The plaintiff has introduced in evidence an advertise-
ment in the Logansport Daily Star. The legal construction of
those advertisements is for the court and not for the jury. Those
advertisements do not give public notice of the existence of a part-
nership known as 'Peoples' Bank.' But the legal effect of them
would be to advise the public that t.heie was a corporation organ-
ized, pursuant to law, in which'Uhl is a stockholder. The plain-
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tiff had no right to rely upon such notice to give credit to Uhl
as a member of a firm known as ' Peoples' Bank,' and if you
find from the evidence that the only notice the plaintiff bad when
he commenced dealing with the bank was by those advertisements,
and that Uhl at that time had retired from the firm, the court
charges you that the plaintiff had no right to rely -apon the same
as a public notice of his being a member of the firm."
"We insist," says counsel, "that the evidence was incompetent.
The plaintiff did not show that Uhl ever authorized the publica-
tion, or that be ever had any notice of it; therefore it was not
competent. It did not tend to prove d partnership, or that Uhl
was a partner. Both of these objections were pointed out."
As we have already said in substance, there was evidence not
only to warrant, but such as required the conclusion, that the
appellant was responsible for the advertisement from the time its
publication began until it was suppressed upon his order, and even
for its continued influence thereafter, because of his failure to give
such notice as was calculated to remove the false impression made
by the continued publication of the notice.
The objection that it did not tend to show a partnership but a
corporate organization is still less tenable. There may be shares
of stock and stockholders in a partnership as well as in a corporate
body. Such in fact was the organization of the Peoples' Bank.
Lindley's very elaborate work is designed mainly to explain the
law of partnership as applicable to stock companies not incorpo-
rated. Besides, the notice under consideration declared every
stockholder individually responsible for all liabilities, which is true
of a partnership, but not true of an incorporated bank, the share-
holders in which under the law of this state are liable to the
extent of the amount of their stock therein, at the par value
thereof, in addition to the amount invested in such shares: 1
Davis Rev. (1876) p. 165, see. 13.
In answer to the questions which were submitted, the jury
found, in substance, that the appellant retired and ceased to be a
partner from and after April 1874, but that his retirement was not
a matter of public notoriety in the neighborhood where the firm
did business at or befbre February 26th 1877; that appellee had
no dealings with the firm before February 23d 1876, the date of
the first certificate in suit that the appellant had done, and per-
mitted acts to be done with his knowledge, which led the appellee
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to believe that' the appellant "was a member of said firm at the
date of any of the instruments sued on," and that at said time the
appellee had other notice or knowledge, besides said advertisement,
that the ippellant had been a partner, and during the time of his
dealing with the firm, the appellee, through no carelessness of his
pwn, acted without notice that the appellant had withdrawn and
believed he was dealing with partners, individually liable, and not
with a corporate body. In view of these facts it is clear that the
general verdict in favor of the appellee is in accordance with the
merits of the case as shown at the trial, and that the adverse
rulings of the court, so far as they appear to be at all questionable,
produced no prejudicial result.
The judgment is therefore affirmed with costs.
NECESSITY Op NOTICE.-Mr. Gow in
his work on Partnership says as to the
liability of a retiring partner: " It has,
therefore, been held that a firm may be
bound after the dissolution of a partner-
ship, by a contract made by one partner
in the name of the firm, with a person
who contracted on the faith of the partner-
ship, and had not notice of the dissolu-
tion. And the principle upon which the
responsibility of the retiring partner
proceeds, being his negligent conduct in
forbearing to give notice, and the con-
sequent ignorance of the world of the
fact of a dissolution having taken place,
he will be liable for the engagements of
the other partner, entered into in the
name of the firm, even with a party
whose dealings began subsequently to
the dissolution of the partnership." (3
Am. 2d, p. 248). And Lord MA.N-srnEW-D
said : "If partners dissolve their part-
nership, they who deal with either with-
out notice of such dissolution, have a
right against both." Cowp. 445. So
wvell established is this rule that the
retiring partner must give notice of his
retirement in order to escape future en-
gagements of the remaining members of
the firm, that we deem it unnecessary to
further discuss it, and only cite a few
of a host of cases to such effect. Le Roy.
v. Johnson, 2 Pet. 186; Hunt v. Hall,
8 Ind. 215; Stall v. Cassady, 57 Ind.
284 ; Hodgcn v. Kief, 63 Ill. 146 ; Hol-
land v. Long, 57 Geo. 37 ; Cannichad v.
Greer, 55 Id. 116. And it is no ex-
cuse that there has been no time to give
such notice. Martin v. Scarles, 28
Conn. 43 ; Alecltanics'Bank v. Livigston,
33 Barb. 458; Bristol v. Sprague, 8
Wend. 423; lMardwcll v. Haight, 2
Barb. 552.
NOTICE .MUST BE exvE.-The duty
of a partner to give notice of his retire-
ment is well stated in the principal case.
All the cases are to the effect that some
kind of notice must be given if the re-
tiring partner would escape liability as to
future obligations entered into by the
remaining partner, in the old firm's
name. "To create a legal obligation as
a partner, it is not neccssar± in fact, or
in law, that the partnership should be
still continuing. The legal obligation
may arise from the acts of the party at
one time, and his forbearance at another
time. (Per ABBOTT, C. J., Goode v. Har-
rison, 5 B. & A. 157.) If a partner,
on his retirement from a partnership,
neglect to notify its dissolution to the
world, he is guilty of a delusion, and as
he thereby induces strangers to believe
that the partnership is continuing,he must
abide by the consequences resulting solely
from his .own negligent imprudence.'
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Gow on Partnership 305. It will thus
be seen that the liability of the retiring
member for the future contracts of the
remaining member, or members, of the
firm, executed in the na-me of the old
firm, with one who had no notice of the
dissolution, but who knew such retiring
member was a member of the old firm,
is placed upon the same broad ground
that one who holds himself out as a
member of an existing firm will be
bound by its contracts. In the case of
a holding out it is an active deception
practiced by the one holding himself out
as a partner, in the other, a passive
deception. One is as effectual as the
other, and both practices reach the same
result. In both cases, the one holding
out, or the retiring member, has practiced
a fraud upon the injured party, and is
estopped to deny that lie is a member of
the firm, and is held liable for his fraudu-
lent acts.
ExPREss NOTIcE.-In respect to pre-
vious customers of the firm, it is neces-
sary that express notice be given, or such
facts must be shown as will warrant a
jury in believing that the party had
actual knowledge of the dissolution.
Osborne v. Harper, 5 East 225 ; Price v.
Towsey, 3 Litt. 423 ; Ketchan v. Clark,
6 Johns. 144; Trernonv. 11anhattan Co.,
17 Wend. 524, s. c. affirmed in Court of
Errors, 22 Id. 182 ; Wardwellv. Haight,
2 Barb. 552; Van Bps v. Dillaye, 6
Barb. 250; Bank of Commonwealth v.
Mfrudgett, 45 Barb. 663; Kirkman v.
Snodgrass, 3 Head. 371; House v.
Thompson, 3 Id. 512 ; Simonds v. Strong,
24 Vt. 642; Amidown v. Osgood, Id.
282; Zollar v. Janr in, 47 N. H. 327 ;
Lyon v. Johnson, 28 Conn. 1 ; Martin v.
,Searles, Id. 46; Walkinson v. Bank of
Pa., 4 Whart. 484; Jiiauldin v. Bank of
M.4obile, 2 Ala. 503; Pope Y. Risley, 23
Mlo. 187; National Bank v. Norton, I
Hill 579 ; White Y. Murphy, 3 Rich. 369;
Lane v. Tyler, 49 Ie. 252; Taylor v.
Hill, 36 Ald. 494 ; Rose v. Coffleld, 53
Md. 18; Merrt v. Pollys, 16 B. Mon.
356; Merritt v. lVilliams, 17 Ran. 287;
In re Krueger, 2 Lowell 66 ; iloltgreve
v. Wintker, 85 111. 470 ; Hicks v. Rus-
sell, 72 Id. 230 ; Southern v. Grim, 67
Id. 106. All persons are chargeable
with notice of the death of a member
of a firm; hence no notice of the death
need be published, either by representa.
fives of the deceased partner or the sur-
vivors. Marlett v. Jackman, 3 Allen
287; Durgin v. Coolidge, Id. 554;
PHce v. 3ilathew's Succession, 14 La.
An. 11.
ALTERATION OF FIRM NAME.-Where
the name is altered and credit given to
the new party and not to the old firm,
the necessity of notice does not exist.
Kirby v. Hewitts, 26 Barb. 608 ; Pome-
roy v. Coons, 20 Mo. 599; Stewart v.
Caldwell, 9 La. 419 ; nor is notice neces-
sary where the party did not know of
the existence of the firm : Carter v.
Whalley, 1 B. & Ad. 13 ; Kennedy v.
Bohannon, 11 B. Ion. 119 ; or of its
members : Dowzelot v. Rawlings, 58 Mio.
75. "N
1 ow, where all the names in a firm
appear, it may be presumed that every
one knows who the partners are "
Consequently if one name is dropped
out, it is notice to the world of a change
in the partnership: Carter v. Walley,
supra; nor need notice be given where it
is merely implied by law. Bigelow v.
Elliot, I Cliff. 41. Where dissolution took
place two years previously, and in the
mean time, the partner had been doing
business separately, notice was inferred ;
Coddington v. Hunt, 6 Hill 596. After
eleven years' suspension of the firm's bus-
iness held no notice was necessary: Far-
mers' 6- iechanics' Bank v. Green, 30
N. J. L. 316. While notice of the disso-
lution must be given to all persons who
have dealt with the firm on a credit
basis, the rule does not apply to parties
who have had mere cash dealings with
the firm : Clapp v. Rogers, 12 N. Y.
285.
CHANCGE O PUnSUITS.-A change of
pursuits, or removal from the state, of
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one partner, it was held, was not notice:
Lucas v. Bank of Darien, 2 Stow. 280;
nor is the incorporation of the firm;
Goddard v. Pratt, 16 Pick. 432 ; and it
was held that a deed of assignment con-
stituting a dissolution, put on record,
was not notice: Pitcher v. Barrows, 17
Pick. 361 ; this was only a common-law
assignment, or trust deed; an assign-
ment under a statute, such as a statutory
voluntary assigunent, would undoubt-
edly be notice to all the world.
DotmAxT PAnTmRn.-It is not neces-
sary that a dormant or silent partner
should give notice of his retirement:
Evans v. Drummond, 4 Esp. 89. This
is quite obvious, because no credit was
ever given upon the faith of his liability:
Scott v. Colmesnil, 7 J. J. Marsh. 416;
Armstron.j v. Hussey, 12 S. & R. 315;
Kelley v. Hurlburt, 5 Cow. 534; Benton
v. Chamberlin, 23 Vt. 711; Ayrault v.
Chamberlain, 26 Barb. h9 ; Kennedy v.
Bohannon, 11 B. Mion. 120; Warren v.
Ball, 37 Il. 81 ; Heath v. Sansom, 1
Nev. & M. 104; Cregler v. Durham, 9
Ind. 375. But it seems that if the os-
tensible party state the existence of the
partnership to a party who deals with
the firm, the dormant partner is liable,
although the communication be made
after the partnership has in fact closed:
Evans v. Drummond, 4 Esp. 89. And
it is very clear if the dealer knew a
party was a dormant partner, notice of
his retirement must be given to such
person, because as to him he is not a
dormant partner: Farrar v. De.flinne, 1
C. & K. 580; see Carter v. Whalley, I
B. & Ad. 14; Park v. Wooten's Ex'r.,
35 Ala. 242; Edwards Y. McFall, 5
La. Ann. 167; Nessbaumer v. Becker,
87 Ill. 281 ; Ellis's Adn'r. v. Bronson,
40 Ill. 455; Joseph v. Fisher, 3 Seam.
137.
BURDEN or Pxoor.-Whether or not
a previous dealer had notice that a dor-
mant partner was a member of a firm,
must be clearly shown before he can re-
cover, especially if the partner was
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generally unknown: Carter v. Whalley,
1 B. & Ad. 11; Edwards v. McFall, 5
La. Ann. 167; Farrar v. Deflinne, 1
Car. & K. 580; but in case of a known
partner, the burden of proof is on the
retiring partner to establish notice, and
if the evidence is conflicting, and leaves
a doubt as to the matter, the benefit of
the doubt will be given to the creditor:
Southern v. Grim, 67 Il. 106; N~ew-
comet v. Brotzman, 69 Penn. St. 185;
Carmichael v. Greer, 55 Geo. 116; Ken-
ney v. Altwater, 77 Penn. St. 34; and
if lie knows the partnership articles pro-
vide for a dissolution upon a certain con-
tingency, he is put upon inquiry whether
a dissolution has actually taken place:
Smith v. Vanderburg, 46 Ill. 34.
HOLDING OUT AFTER RETIREMENT.
-The retiring partner, although lie may
have given notice of his retirement, will
be held liable to subsequent dealers if
he holds himself out to the public as a
partner: lVilliams v. Keats, 2 Stark.
290; Emmet v. Butler, 7 Taunt. 600;
Brown v. Leonard, 2 Chitty 120; Stables
v. E ley, 1 Car. & P. 614; M1ulford v.
Griffin, 1 F. & F., N. P. 145 ; Faldo
v. Grzfln, Id. 147; Western Bank of
Scotland, Id. 463; Howe v. Thayer, 17
Pick. 91.
NoTms.-A retiring partner is liable
on a note executed in the firm name by
the remaining partner after the dissolu-
tion, although the plaintiff knew the
fact at the time she took the note, where
the defendant had suffered his name to
continue in the firm: Brown v. Leondrd,
2 Chit. 120. And if the retiring part-
ner make a payment on the note so exe-
cuted, he will be held liable for the re-
mainder due : Eaton v. Taylor, 10 'ass.
54.
NOTICE TO AN AGENT.-NOtiCe to an
agent is nor notice to the principal unless
the agent was authorized to represent
the principal in such matter: Stewart
v. Sonneborn, 49 Ala. 178; contra, Page
v. Brent, 18 Ill. 37. But notice to a
director of a bank, unless it reach those
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intrusted with the management of the
bank, is not notice to the bank: National
Bank v. N~orton, 1 Hill 572; nor is the
fact that one partner became, after dis-
solution, a director in tte bank, notice
to the bank of dissolution: Lucas v.
Bank of Darien, 2 Stew. 280. But if
the bank acted upon the notice given to
the director, such notice would be suffi-
cient: Bank of United States v. Davis,
2 Hill 45 1. If the president of a hank
has knowledge of the dissolution, it is
notice to the bank: Easter v. Farmers'
National Bank, 57 1ll. 216. In Stewart
v. Sonneborn, 51 Ala. 1213, it is said an
agent having authority may give notice of
dissolution; but it Tmay to said that any
one may give notice of dissolution of a
firm, and it matters not how or through
what channel notice in given, so it
reaches the party to be affected by it:
Hicks v. Russell, 72 Il. 230; Southern
v. Grim, 67 Id. 106.
WHO AnE Potnvious DEALnus.-As
to who are previous dealers must be de-
cided upon the facts in each case; no
general rule can be laid down. Selling
goods to a firm and delivering them to
be paid for afterwards, although no term
of credit is fixed, would make the sellers
dealers so as to entitle them to notice :
Clapp v. Rogers, 2 Kern. 283; so a
bank which had previously been in the
habit of discounting notes and bills for
a firm : Hutchins v. Banc of Tennessee,
8 Humph. 418 ; or a person who had been
in the habit of endorsing for a firm:
H'tchinsv. Sims, 8 Humph. 423; or lend-
ing his note to it for its credit: Hutchins
v. Hudson, 8 Humph. 426 ; two previous
dealings with the firm will entitle the
dealer to notice: TFard,yell v. Haight,
2 Barb. 549 ; see Amidown v. Osgood,
24 Vt. 278; a single cash sale of cattle
does not make the vendor such a pre-
vious dealer: Meriitt v. Williams, 17
Kan. 287.
Surnici c-y or NoTcE.-One of
the earliest cases upon the sufficiency of
notice is Godfrey v. Turnbull, 1 Esp.
371 (1795). That was an action by the
plaintiff as indorser of a promissory
note against the defendants as makers
of it. The defendants had been partners
in trade, but the partnership had been
dissolved prior to the date of the note.
The note was dated April 6th 1793. On
March 19th 1793, notice of the dissolu-
tion of the partnership, dated he 15th,
had appeared in the Gazette. The
question was, whether the notice given
in the Gazette was sufficient so as to ex-
onerate the defendant Turnbull (judg-
ment having been rendered against the
other defendant Jby default). Lord
KENYoN, in delivering the opinion,
said : "A secret dissolution cannot dis-
charge the partners ; but if the dissolu-
tion is notified in the usual way, as it is
the only mode by which the fact of the
dissolution can be promulgated to the
world, at least to those who have had
no previous dealings with the partners,
it seems sufficient at least to he left to
the jury, from thence to infer notice."
No proof of any actual notice to the
plaintiff was given, but the jury found
for the defendant Turnbull. See to
same effect, Wrightson v. Pulan, 1
Stark. 300. In Graham v. Hope, Peake
155, the same judge observed: " The
Gazette was not of itself sufficient notice
to the plaintiff of the dissolution of the
partnership. I do not say this for the
purpose of this cause merely, but I mean
to lay it down as a general rule to gov-
ern the conduct of all men. Many
people there are in this kingdom who
never see a Gazette to the day of their
deaths, and very mischievous would be
the consequence if they were bound by
a notice inserted iii it. It is incumbent
on persons dissolving a partnership to
send notice of such dissolution to all
persons with whom they bad dealings in
partnership." See Kirwan v. Kirwan,
4 Tyrw. 491.
Although notice may not have been
expressly given, it will; under certain
circumstances, be presumed. Thus,
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where a change had taken place in the
name of the firm in the printed checks
of a banking-house, it was held that it
was a sufficient notice to the customer
of a change in the firm: Barfoot v. Good-
all, 3 Campb. 147 ; or in an executed
power of attorney to prove a debt against
a bankruptcy estate: Hart v. Alexander,
2 31. & W. 484. But the change in the
check is not conclusive evidence of no-
tice: Newcomet v. Brotzman, 69 Penna.
St. 185. See Pwberts v. Spencer, 123
Mass. 397. And when the retiring
partner gave notice of his retirement by
a circular letter, of his assignment to his
copartner of all his interest in a ship,
but, owing to a defect in the assign-
ment, the registry of the ship was con-
tinued in the old firm name, it was held
that one doing business with the firm
previous to the assignment could not
hold the retiring partner for subsequent
contracts, because of the defective as-
signment, he having received one of
the circulars: H'Iver v. Humble, 16
East 169.
Proof of the insertion of a notice of
dissolution in the Gazette, although in-
serted but once, which paper is taken
by the party seeking to hold the retiring
member of the firm, and left at his house
in the usual course, is evidence to be left
to the jury, Without strict proof that the
paper ever reached the party: Jenkins v.
Blizird, I Stark. 338. But notice in
the newspapers and mere notoriety, of
themselves, do not amount, in law, to
notice, although they are undoubtedly
proper evidence for the consideration
of the jury in determining upon the fact
of actual knowledge or notice: Page v.
Brant, 18 Ill. 37. The ruleisnot inflexi-
ble that there must be a publication in a
newspaper. Any means of fairly publish-
ing the fact of dissolution as widely as
possible is proper to be considered on the
question of notice: Lovejoy v. Spafford,
93 U. S. 430.
But, in M-audlin v. Bank of .Mobile,
2 Ala. 502, it is said that notice of the
dissolution of a partnership, puolished in
one of the usual advertising gazettes of
the place where the business was carried
on, and in a fair and usual manner, is
not only presumptive, but conclusive,
evidence of notice: Martin v. Walton, 1
McCord 16; Shurlds v. Tilson, 2 Mc-
Lean 458.
Contra: It is not actual notice: Ver-
non v. Manhattaa Co., 22 Wend. 183;
s. a. 17 Id. 526; Williamson v. Fox,
2 Wright 214 ; SIzannel v. Taylor, 12
La. Ann. 773; Bank of Brooklyn v.
McChesney, 20 N. Y. 240; Zollar v.
J"anvrin, 47 N. H. 324; Simonds v.
Strong, 24 Vt. 642 ; Austin v. Holland,
69 N. Y. 571 ; Watkinson v. Bank of
Pennsylvania, 4 Whart. 482; Pope v.
Risley, 23 Mo. 185.
As to all persons, except those who
have had dealings with the firm pre-
viously, a general public notice calcu-
lated to circulate far enough to reach all
who are likely to have transactions with
the members of the firm will be suffi-
cient notice, and is necessary: Mitdium
v. Bank of Kentucky, 9 Dana 166 ; White-
sides v, Lee, I Scam. 550; Graves v.
Merry,.6 Cow. 701 ; Ketcham v. Clark,
6 Johns. 144; Lansing v. Gaine 6- Ten
Eyck, 2 Id. 304; Treadwell v. Wells, 4
Cal. 260; Green v. Merchants' Ins. Co.,
10 Pick. 402; Shurlds v. Tilson, 2 Mc-
Lean 458. And in HickLs v. Russell, 72
Ill. 230, it is said a newspaper notice is
sufficient.
Held, that a notice published in a
newspaper taken by the bank was suffi-
cient as to previous dealers: Bank of
South Carolina v. Humphreys, 1 McCord
388. This case is undoubtedly not in
harmony with the general rule as de-
clared by the authorities previously cited.
Where proof has been given that a
newspaper containing a notice of dis-
solution of the partnership between the
defendants was .taken by the plaintiffs
at the time, it is not error to admit in
evidence other papers not taken by them
by way of establishing the publicity of
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the notice and raising the presumption
of their actual knowledge of the fact:
Treadwell v. Wells, 4 Cal. 260'; Reilly
v. Smith, 16 La. Ann. 31.
If the plaintiff did not take or read
the paper, it is inadmissible as evidence
of notice : Boyd v. AfTcCann, 10 Md. 118.
The fact that the firm's name was kept
over the door after dissolution of the
partnerslip is not of itself sufficient to
authorize the holder of a note signed in
the firm name to recover. Boyd v.
McCann, supra.
The fact that the notice is notorious is
not sufficient as to past dealers, unless
there is an actual notice : Martin v.
Searles, 28 Conn. 43 ; Titcher v. Bar-
rows, 17 Pick. 361. See Holdane v.
Butterworth, 5 Bosw. 1.
The fact that the plaintiffs do business
in the same town with the defendants
and have an advertisement standing next
to the advertisement of the dissolution
of the partnership of the defendants,
although to be considered in determining
whether the plaintiffs had actual notice,
is of no avail in law against the fact
that they, being dealers previous to the
dissolution, have no actual notice, Lyon
v. Johnson, 28 Conn. 1.
The registry of a mortgage by the
remainirig member of a firm to the re-
tiring partner, even of goods like those
of the firm, or even if brought to the
knowledge of the creditor will not, as a
matter of law, put hEm upon his inquiry.
Zollar v. Janvrin, 47 N. I. 324.
It is error to charge the jury that
casual conversations on the street, which
the parties do not remember, in relation
to a dissolution of a partnership is notice,
unless the parties interested are dis-
tinctly apprised, and know at the time,
it was intended as such notice : Davis
v. Keyes. 38 N. Y. 94. It is not neces-
sary that the notice, published in a paper,
of the dissolution should be signed by
any one : Young v. Tibbitts, 32 Wis. 79.
Where there was a dissolution by agree-
ment, and it appeared to be the practice
of the "London Gazette" office not to in.
sert a notice of dissolution unless signed
by all the partners, the defendant who re-
fused to sign a notice was decreed to do
so. Toughton v. Hunter, 18 Bear. 470.
Where, after dissolution, new notes are
given by one of the partners in the firm
name, the evidence should be clear and
satisfactory of the notice of such disso-
lution to the creditor accepting such
notes, to discharge the other partner:
Ransom v. Loyless, 49 Geo. 471.
A letter stating the dissolution of a
firm directed to the defendant, with evi-
dence that the letter was not returned
from the Dead Letter Office, is not suffi-
cient, without other evidence of its re-
ceipt, to charge defendant with notice of
the dissolution. But with slight corro-
borative evidence, a jury might be justi-
fied in finding such notice was given.
Kenney v. Altvater 6- Co., 77 -Pa. St.
34. Contra, Hutchins v. Bank of Ten-
nessee, 8 Humph. 418: nor is a news-
paper sent through tie mail with the
notice marked by a red line drawn
around it: Haynes v. Carter, 12 Heisk.
7 ; 'Austin v. Holland, 69 N. Y. 571.
The question being one of diligence
and good faith on the part of the retir-
ing partner, he will not be allowed to
avail himself of a published notice, un-
less it appears to have been as reason-
able and sufficient as mercantile usage
requires, or the public have a right to
expect. Wardwell v. H ight, 2 Barb.
549 ; Wait v. Brewster, 31 Vt. 516;
Dwzelot v. Rawlings, 58 Mo. 75.
The taking in of a new partner is not
notice of dissolution to previous dealers.
American Linen Thread Co. v. Worten-
dyke, 24 N. Y. 551.
Nor is the mere discontinuance of
business by an old firm and the forma-
tion of a new one, evidence, without
notice to the creditor, of a dissolution.
Southwick v. Allen, 11 "Vt. 77.
Junry.-It is a question for, the jury
as to whether notice was actually re-
ceived. Whitesides v. Lee, 1 Scam.
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550; Treadwell v. Well., I Cal. 260;
Tfabe v. Wells, 3 Id. 148 ; Ketchan v.
Clark, 6 Johns. 147 ; Rooth v. Quinn,
3 Eng. Excb. 18 ; Jenkins v. Blizzard,
I Stark. 418 ; Tudor v. White, 27 Texas
584; Laird v. kvens, 45 Id. 622.
D Tar.-Where a note was given by
one of the surviving partners after the
death of one of their members, the other
surviving partners are not bound by it
as the death of one of their partners is
notice to all the world of the dissolution :
M1arlett v. Jaeekman, 3 Alien 287 ; Dur-
gin v. Coolidge, Id. 585 ; Price v. Ma-
thew's Succession, 14 La. Ann. 11.
I oVAL O FiRnI.-Where a firm
was doing business in Mobile and dis-
solved, one of the members going to
Milwaukee, forming a new partnership
with a third person under the same title
of the old firm, it was held that a dealer
with the old firm could not hold the
retired partner, because he had never
given notice of the dissolution; and that
the rule of notice did not extend to a
case where the business was conducted
in a new place, as distant as Milwaukee
was from Mobile; that in such case the
creditors were bound to inquire as to
who formed the partnership in the new
location : Clapp v. Upson, 12 Wis. 492.
So where A and B are partners, and B
and C form another partnership, it is
not necessary for A to publish a notice
that he is not a member of the firm of
B and 0: Jones v. O'Farrel, I Nev.
354. Noticeof the dissolution need not
be given by a member of the firm:
Young v. Tibelts, 32 Wis. 79.
INSTAN'CEs.-Wherc a retiring part-'
ner has taken the proper steps for pub-
lishing his retirement, he will not be
liable to parties ignorant of the dissolu-
tion of the firm on account of an obliga-
tion undertaken by the remaining part-
ners under the old name of the firm:
Newsoine v. Coles, 2 Camp. 617.
The rule does not extend to require
notice to the successor in business of a
creditor with whom the firm has had
dealings, although such successor may
have been a clerk in his predecessor's
employ, and as such acquired knowledge
of who composed the other firm, and
after his succession to the business may
have continued to deal with the firm
under the impression that the retired
partner was still a member of it: Rid-
ardson v. Snider, 20 Amer. Law Reg.
393.
The rule that notice must be given
to old dealers applies only to transactions
in the usual course of business : Whit-
man v. Leonard, 3 Pick. 177.
The practice of the old firm " to make
monthly reports or returns to persons
consigiling goods to them," does not
legitimately tend to show notice to the
plaintiff, a creditor of the old firm, of a
change in the partnership ; but business
letters, written to him by the new firm,
are admissible as evidence for that pur-
pose: Hall v. Jones, 56 Ala. 493.
Notice of the dissolution by publication
in a newspaper is notice to an assignee
before maturity of a promissory note
executed by one of the partners after
the dissolution, in the name of the firm,
to a person who was chargeable with
notice, such assignee having had no deal-
ing with the firm prior to its dissolution:
Hicls v. Russell, 72 l. 230.
Signing a note with the firm name,
where the words "in liquidation" are
inserted in the body of the note, is of
itself notice to the taker of such note
that the partnership has been dissolved:
Haddock v. Crocheron, 32 Tex. 276.
Where the plaintiff was privy to an
intention of partners to dissolve their
partnership, which was in the course of
execution, it was held that, in an action
founded upon a supposed subsequent
partnership transaction, the plaintiff
must show that the intention was aban-
doned: Paten-son v. Zadariah, I Stark.
N. P. C. 58. Express notice, to be
available, must be given to every per-
son entitled to it, for a communication
of the fact to one may he rerdered ruga-
